Cognitive liberty: Difference between revisions

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'''Cognitive liberty'''~~, or the~~ '''"right to mental self-determination"''', is the freedom of an individual to control his or her own mental processes, cognition, and consciousness. It has been argued to be both an extension of, and the principle underlying, the right to freedom of thought.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Sententia|first=Wrye|title=Neuroethical Considerations: Cognitive Liberty and Converging Technologies for Improving Human Cognition|journal=Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences|date=2004|page=223|doi=10.1196/annals.1305.014 |volume=1013}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last=Bublitz|first=Jan Christoph|author2=Merkel, Reinhard|title=Crime Against Minds: On Mental Manipulations, Harms and a Human Right to Mental Self-Determination|journal=Criminal Law and Philosophy|date=2014|volume=8|page=61}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Waterman|first=Daniel|editor-last=Hardison|editor-first=Casey William|title=Entheogens, Society & Law: Towards a Politics of Consciousness, Autonomy and Responsibility|publisher=Melrose Books|date=2013|page=18|isbn=9781908645616}}</ref> Though a relatively recently defined concept, many theorists see cognitive liberty as being of increasing importance as technological advances in neuroscience allow for an ever-expanding ability to directly influence consciousness.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Walsh|first=Charlotte|title=Drugs and human rights: private palliatives, sacramental freedoms and cognitive liberty|journal=International Journal of Human Rights|date=2010|volume=14|issue=3|page=433|doi=10.1080/13642980802704270|url=https://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/law/postgraduate/phd-mphil-research/files/Drugs-and-human-rights-Walsh-2010.pdf|access-date=2015-05-16|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160208015630/https://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/law/postgraduate/phd-mphil-research/files/Drugs-and-human-rights-Walsh-2010.pdf|archive-date=2016-02-08|url-status=dead}}</ref> Cognitive liberty is not a recognized right in any international human rights treaties, but has gained a limited level of recognition in the United States, and is argued to be the principle underlying a number of recognized rights.<ref>Bublitz and Merkel, 60-1</ref>

'''Cognitive liberty''' (also known as '''"the right to mental self-determination"''') is the freedom of an individual to control his or her own mental processes, cognition, and consciousness. It has been argued to be both an extension of, and the principle underlying, the right to freedom of thought.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Sententia|first=Wrye|title=Neuroethical Considerations: Cognitive Liberty and Converging Technologies for Improving Human Cognition|journal=Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences|date=2004|page=223|doi=10.1196/annals.1305.014 |volume=1013}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last=Bublitz|first=Jan Christoph|author2=Merkel, Reinhard|title=Crime Against Minds: On Mental Manipulations, Harms and a Human Right to Mental Self-Determination|journal=Criminal Law and Philosophy|date=2014|volume=8|page=61}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Waterman|first=Daniel|editor-last=Hardison|editor-first=Casey William|title=Entheogens, Society & Law: Towards a Politics of Consciousness, Autonomy and Responsibility|publisher=Melrose Books|date=2013|page=18|isbn=9781908645616}}</ref>

Though a relatively recently defined concept, many theorists see cognitive liberty as being of increasing importance as technological advances in neuroscience allow for an ever-expanding ability to directly influence consciousness.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Walsh|first=Charlotte|title=Drugs and human rights: private palliatives, sacramental freedoms and cognitive liberty|journal=International Journal of Human Rights|date=2010|volume=14|issue=3|page=433|doi=10.1080/13642980802704270|url=https://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/law/postgraduate/phd-mphil-research/files/Drugs-and-human-rights-Walsh-2010.pdf|access-date=2015-05-16|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160208015630/https://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/law/postgraduate/phd-mphil-research/files/Drugs-and-human-rights-Walsh-2010.pdf|archive-date=2016-02-08|url-status=dead}}</ref>

Cognitive liberty is not a recognized right in any international human rights treaties, but has gained a limited level of recognition in the United States, and is argued to be the principle underlying a number of recognized rights.<ref>Bublitz and Merkel, 60-1</ref>

==Overview==

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===Freedom from interference===

This first obligation, to refrain from non-consensually interfering with an individual's cognitive processes, seeks to protect individuals from having their mental processes altered or monitored without their consent or knowledge, "setting up a defensive wall against unwanted intrusions".<ref>Bublitz and Merkel, 60</ref> Ongoing improvements to neurotechnologies such as transcranial magnetic stimulation and electroencephalography (or "brain fingerprinting"); and to pharmacology in the form of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor] (SSRIs), [[nootropics]], [[modafinil]] and other [[psychoactive substances]], are continuing to increase the ability to both monitor and directly influence human cognition.<ref>Sententia (2004), 223-224</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last=Blitz|first=Marc Jonathan|title=Freedom of Thought for the Extended Mind: Cognitive Enhancement and the Constitution|journal=Wisconsin Law Review|date=2010|issue=1049|pages=1053–1055, 1058–1060|url=http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=marc_jonathan_blitz}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last=Rosen|first=Jeffrey|title=The Brain on the Stand|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/11/magazine/11Neurolaw.t.html|accessdate=3 May 2014|newspaper=New York Times Magazine|date=11 March 2007}}</ref> As a result, many theorists have emphasized the importance of recognizing cognitive liberty in order to protect individuals from the state using such technologies to alter those individuals’ mental processes: "states must be barred from invading the inner sphere of persons, from accessing their thoughts, modulating their emotions or manipulating their personal preferences."<ref>Bublitz and Merkel, 61</ref> These specific ethical concerns regarding the use of neuroscience technologies to interfere or invade the brain form the fields of neuroethics and neuroprivacy.<ref>{{Citation|last=Roskies|first=Adina L.|title=Mind Reading, Lie Detection, and Privacy|date=2015|url=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4707-4_123|work=Handbook of Neuroethics|pages=679–695|editor-last=Clausen|editor-first=Jens|publisher=Springer Netherlands~~|language=en~~|doi=10.1007/978-94-007-4707-4_123|isbn=9789400747074|access-date=2019-08-15|editor2-last=Levy|editor2-first=Neil}}</ref>

This first obligation, to refrain from non-consensually interfering with an individual's cognitive processes, seeks to protect individuals from having their mental processes altered or monitored without their consent or knowledge, "setting up a defensive wall against unwanted intrusions".<ref>Bublitz and Merkel, 60</ref> Ongoing improvements to neurotechnologies such as transcranial magnetic stimulation and electroencephalography (or "brain fingerprinting"); and to pharmacology in the form of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor] (SSRIs), [[nootropics]], [[modafinil]] and other [[psychoactive substances]], are continuing to increase the ability to both monitor and directly influence human cognition.<ref>Sententia (2004), 223-224</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last=Blitz|first=Marc Jonathan|title=Freedom of Thought for the Extended Mind: Cognitive Enhancement and the Constitution|journal=Wisconsin Law Review|date=2010|issue=1049|pages=1053–1055, 1058–1060|url=http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=marc_jonathan_blitz}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last=Rosen|first=Jeffrey|title=The Brain on the Stand|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/11/magazine/11Neurolaw.t.html|accessdate=3 May 2014|newspaper=New York Times Magazine|date=11 March 2007}}</ref> As a result, many theorists have emphasized the importance of recognizing cognitive liberty in order to protect individuals from the state using such technologies to alter those individuals’ mental processes: "states must be barred from invading the inner sphere of persons, from accessing their thoughts, modulating their emotions or manipulating their personal preferences."<ref>Bublitz and Merkel, 61</ref> These specific ethical concerns regarding the use of neuroscience technologies to interfere or invade the brain form the fields of neuroethics and neuroprivacy.<ref>{{Citation|last=Roskies|first=Adina L.|title=Mind Reading, Lie Detection, and Privacy|date=2015|url=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4707-4_123|work=Handbook of Neuroethics|pages=679–695|editor-last=Clausen|editor-first=Jens|publisher=Springer Netherlands|doi=10.1007/978-94-007-4707-4_123|isbn=9789400747074|access-date=2019-08-15|editor2-last=Levy|editor2-first=Neil}}</ref>

This element of cognitive liberty has been raised in relation to a number of state-sanctioned interventions in individual cognition, from the mandatory psychiatric 'treatment' of homosexuals in the US before the 1970s, to the non-consensual administration of psychoactive drugs to unwitting US citizens during [[CIA]] [[Project MKUltra]], to the forcible administration of mind-altering drugs on individuals to make them competent to stand trial.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Boire|first=Richard Glen|title=On Cognitive Liberty Part I|journal=Journal of Cognitive Liberties|date=1999|volume=1|issue=1|url=http://www.cognitiveliberty.org/curriculum/oncoglib_123.htm}}</ref><ref>Boire, Richard Glen, (2002). ''[http://www.cognitiveliberty.org/pdf/sell_ussc_merits.pdf Brief Amicus Curiae Of The Center For Cognitive Liberty & Ethics In Support Of The Petition]'', in the case of ''Sell v United States''</ref> Futurist and bioethicist George Dvorsky, Chair of the Board of the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies has identified this element of cognitive liberty as being of relevance to the debate around the curing of autism spectrum conditions.<ref>{{cite web|last=Dvorsky|first=George|title=Cognitive liberty and the right to one's mind|url=http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/more/dvorsky20091020|publisher=Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies|accessdate=3 May 2014}}</ref> Duke University School of Law Professor Nita A. Farahany has also proposed legislative protection of cognitive liberty as a way of safeguarding the protection from self-incrimination found in the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution, in the light of the increasing ability to access human memory.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Farahany|first=Nita|title=Incriminating Thoughts|journal=Stanford Law Review|date=February 2012|volume=64|pages=405–406|url=http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5321&context=faculty_scholarship}}</ref>

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===In the United Kingdom===

In the case of ''R v Hardison'', the defendant, charged with eight counts under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (MDA), including the production of [[DMT]] and [[LSD]], claimed that cognitive liberty was safeguarded by Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights.<ref>R v Hardison [2007] 1 Cr App R (S) 37</ref> Hardison argued that "individual sovereignty over one's interior environment constitutes the very core of what it means to be free", and that as psychotropic drugs are a potent method of altering an individual's mental process, prohibition of them under the MDA was in opposition to Article 9.<ref>Walsh, 433</ref> The court, however, disagreed, calling Hardison's arguments a "portmanteau defense" and relying upon the UN Drug Conventions and the earlier case of ''R v Taylor'' to deny Hardison's right to appeal to a superior court.<ref>Walsh, 437</ref> Hardison was convicted and given a 20-year prison sentence, though he was released on 29 May 2013 after nine years in prison.<ref>Walsh, 437</ref>

In the case of ''R v Hardison'', the defendant, charged with eight counts under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (MDA), including the production of [[DMT]] and [[LSD]], claimed that cognitive liberty was safeguarded by Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights.<ref>R v Hardison [2007] 1 Cr App R (S) 37</ref> Hardison argued that "individual sovereignty over one's interior environment constitutes the very core of what it means to be free", and that as psychotropic drugs are a potent method of altering an individual's mental process, prohibition of them under the MDA was in opposition to Article 9.<ref>Walsh, 433</ref> The court, however, disagreed, calling Hardison's arguments a "portmanteau defense" and relying upon the UN Drug Conventions and the earlier case of ''R v Taylor'' to deny Hardison's right to appeal to a superior court.<ref>Walsh, 437</ref> Hardison was convicted and given a 20-year prison sentence, though he was released on 29 May 2013 after nine years in prison.<ref>Walsh, 437</ref> Casey Hardison's arrest marked the first detected case of LSD manufacture inside the UK since 1978's arrest of chemists Richard Kemp and Munro<ref>http://www.drugwise.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Druglink-Jan-Feb-2011.pdf</ref>.

~~==Criticism==~~

Richard Kemp had originally written an 8,000 word defence statement for his arrest in the UK police investigation [[Operation Julie]] but was advised by his lawyers against using it. It was released at the time to a journalist at the Cambrian News who précised it under the headline ‘Microdoctrine – the tenets behind Kemp’s LSD’. The gist of Kemp’s defence was that LSD was a catalyst for social change, his motive behind the ring's leadership was the expectation that widespread use of LSD by Britain's youth would catalyse a leftist Revolution, leading to the overthrow of the aging and morally bankrupt. For the temerity of admitting this to post-arrest police, sentences totalled 120 years in prison.<ref>https://archive.org/stream/THELAND_201412/Acid%20Daze%20-%20Brotherhood%20of%20Eternal%20Love,%20History_djvu.txt</ref> The Kemp branch allegedly manufactured 50% of the world's LSD at the time, amounting to tens of millions of hits over a several year period.

== Criticism ==

While there has been little publicized criticism of the concept of cognitive liberty itself, drug policy reform and the concept of human enhancement, both closely linked to cognitive liberty, remain highly controversial issues. The recent development of neurosciences is increasing the possibility of controlling and influence specific mental functions.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Ferro|first=Fulvio|last2=Gerola|first2=Alessio|last3=Mazzocca|first3=Marco|last4=Sommaggio|first4=Paolo|date=2017-11-01|title=Cognitive liberty. A first step towards a human neuro-rights declaration|url=http://www.biodiritto.org/ojs/index.php?journal=biolaw&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=255|journal=BioLaw Journal - Rivista di BioDiritto|language=it|volume=0|issue=3|pages=27–45–45|issn=2284-4503}}</ref> The risks inherent in removing restrictions on controlled cognitive-enhancing drugs, including of widening the gap between those able to afford such treatments and those unable to do so, have caused many to remain skeptical about the wisdom of recognizing cognitive liberty as a right.<ref>Blitz, 1063</ref> political philosopher and Harvard University professor Michael J. Sandel, when examining the prospect of memory enhancement, wrote that "some who worry about the ethics of cognitive enhancement point to the danger of creating two classes of human beings – those with access to enhancement technologies, and those who must make do with an unaltered memory that fades with age."<ref>{{cite book|last=Sandel|first=Michael J.|title=The Case against Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic Engineering|date=2007|publisher=Harvard University Press|location=Cambridge, Massachusetts|isbn=9780674036383}}</ref> Cognitive liberty then faces opposition obliquely in these interrelated debates.

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-'''Cognitive liberty''', or the '''"right to mental self-determination"''', is the freedom of an individual to control his or her own mental processes, cognition, and consciousness. It has been argued to be both an extension of, and the principle underlying, the right to freedom of thought.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Sententia|first=Wrye|title=Neuroethical Considerations: Cognitive Liberty and Converging Technologies for Improving Human Cognition|journal=Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences|date=2004|page=223|doi=10.1196/annals.1305.014 |volume=1013}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last=Bublitz|first=Jan Christoph|author2=Merkel, Reinhard|title=Crime Against Minds: On Mental Manipulations, Harms and a Human Right to Mental Self-Determination|journal=Criminal Law and Philosophy|date=2014|volume=8|page=61}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Waterman|first=Daniel|editor-last=Hardison|editor-first=Casey William|title=Entheogens, Society & Law: Towards a Politics of Consciousness, Autonomy and Responsibility|publisher=Melrose Books|date=2013|page=18|isbn=9781908645616}}</ref> Though a relatively recently defined concept, many theorists see cognitive liberty as being of increasing importance as technological advances in neuroscience allow for an ever-expanding ability to directly influence consciousness.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Walsh|first=Charlotte|title=Drugs and human rights: private palliatives, sacramental freedoms and cognitive liberty|journal=International Journal of Human Rights|date=2010|volume=14|issue=3|page=433|doi=10.1080/13642980802704270|url=https://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/law/postgraduate/phd-mphil-research/files/Drugs-and-human-rights-Walsh-2010.pdf|access-date=2015-05-16|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160208015630/https://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/law/postgraduate/phd-mphil-research/files/Drugs-and-human-rights-Walsh-2010.pdf|archive-date=2016-02-08|url-status=dead}}</ref> Cognitive liberty is not a recognized right in any international human rights treaties, but has gained a limited level of recognition in the United States, and is argued to be the principle underlying a number of recognized rights.<ref>Bublitz and Merkel, 60-1</ref>
+'''Cognitive liberty''' (also known as '''"the right to mental self-determination"''') is the freedom of an individual to control his or her own mental processes, cognition, and consciousness. It has been argued to be both an extension of, and the principle underlying, the right to freedom of thought.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Sententia|first=Wrye|title=Neuroethical Considerations: Cognitive Liberty and Converging Technologies for Improving Human Cognition|journal=Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences|date=2004|page=223|doi=10.1196/annals.1305.014 |volume=1013}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last=Bublitz|first=Jan Christoph|author2=Merkel, Reinhard|title=Crime Against Minds: On Mental Manipulations, Harms and a Human Right to Mental Self-Determination|journal=Criminal Law and Philosophy|date=2014|volume=8|page=61}}</ref><ref>{{cite book|last=Waterman|first=Daniel|editor-last=Hardison|editor-first=Casey William|title=Entheogens, Society & Law: Towards a Politics of Consciousness, Autonomy and Responsibility|publisher=Melrose Books|date=2013|page=18|isbn=9781908645616}}</ref>
+Though a relatively recently defined concept, many theorists see cognitive liberty as being of increasing importance as technological advances in neuroscience allow for an ever-expanding ability to directly influence consciousness.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Walsh|first=Charlotte|title=Drugs and human rights: private palliatives, sacramental freedoms and cognitive liberty|journal=International Journal of Human Rights|date=2010|volume=14|issue=3|page=433|doi=10.1080/13642980802704270|url=https://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/law/postgraduate/phd-mphil-research/files/Drugs-and-human-rights-Walsh-2010.pdf|access-date=2015-05-16|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160208015630/https://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/law/postgraduate/phd-mphil-research/files/Drugs-and-human-rights-Walsh-2010.pdf|archive-date=2016-02-08|url-status=dead}}</ref>
+Cognitive liberty is not a recognized right in any international human rights treaties, but has gained a limited level of recognition in the United States, and is argued to be the principle underlying a number of recognized rights.<ref>Bublitz and Merkel, 60-1</ref>
 ==Overview==
@@ Line 21: / Line 25: @@
 ===Freedom from interference===
-This first obligation, to refrain from non-consensually interfering with an individual's cognitive processes, seeks to protect individuals from having their mental processes altered or monitored without their consent or knowledge, "setting up a defensive wall against unwanted intrusions".<ref>Bublitz and Merkel, 60</ref>  Ongoing improvements to neurotechnologies such as transcranial magnetic stimulation and electroencephalography (or "brain fingerprinting"); and to pharmacology in the form of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor] (SSRIs), [[nootropics]], [[modafinil]] and other [[psychoactive substances]], are continuing to increase the ability to both monitor and directly influence human cognition.<ref>Sententia (2004), 223-224</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last=Blitz|first=Marc Jonathan|title=Freedom of Thought for the Extended Mind: Cognitive Enhancement and the Constitution|journal=Wisconsin Law Review|date=2010|issue=1049|pages=1053–1055, 1058–1060|url=http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=marc_jonathan_blitz}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last=Rosen|first=Jeffrey|title=The Brain on the Stand|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/11/magazine/11Neurolaw.t.html|accessdate=3 May 2014|newspaper=New York Times Magazine|date=11 March 2007}}</ref> As a result, many theorists have emphasized the importance of recognizing cognitive liberty in order to protect individuals from the state using such technologies to alter those individuals’ mental processes: "states must be barred from invading the inner sphere of persons, from accessing their thoughts, modulating their emotions or manipulating their personal preferences."<ref>Bublitz and Merkel, 61</ref>  These specific ethical concerns regarding the use of neuroscience technologies to interfere or invade the brain form the fields of neuroethics and neuroprivacy.<ref>{{Citation|last=Roskies|first=Adina L.|title=Mind Reading, Lie Detection, and Privacy|date=2015|url=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4707-4_123|work=Handbook of Neuroethics|pages=679–695|editor-last=Clausen|editor-first=Jens|publisher=Springer Netherlands|language=en|doi=10.1007/978-94-007-4707-4_123|isbn=9789400747074|access-date=2019-08-15|editor2-last=Levy|editor2-first=Neil}}</ref>
+This first obligation, to refrain from non-consensually interfering with an individual's cognitive processes, seeks to protect individuals from having their mental processes altered or monitored without their consent or knowledge, "setting up a defensive wall against unwanted intrusions".<ref>Bublitz and Merkel, 60</ref>  Ongoing improvements to neurotechnologies such as transcranial magnetic stimulation and electroencephalography (or "brain fingerprinting"); and to pharmacology in the form of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor] (SSRIs), [[nootropics]], [[modafinil]] and other [[psychoactive substances]], are continuing to increase the ability to both monitor and directly influence human cognition.<ref>Sententia (2004), 223-224</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last=Blitz|first=Marc Jonathan|title=Freedom of Thought for the Extended Mind: Cognitive Enhancement and the Constitution|journal=Wisconsin Law Review|date=2010|issue=1049|pages=1053–1055, 1058–1060|url=http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=marc_jonathan_blitz}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last=Rosen|first=Jeffrey|title=The Brain on the Stand|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/11/magazine/11Neurolaw.t.html|accessdate=3 May 2014|newspaper=New York Times Magazine|date=11 March 2007}}</ref> As a result, many theorists have emphasized the importance of recognizing cognitive liberty in order to protect individuals from the state using such technologies to alter those individuals’ mental processes: "states must be barred from invading the inner sphere of persons, from accessing their thoughts, modulating their emotions or manipulating their personal preferences."<ref>Bublitz and Merkel, 61</ref>  These specific ethical concerns regarding the use of neuroscience technologies to interfere or invade the brain form the fields of neuroethics and neuroprivacy.<ref>{{Citation|last=Roskies|first=Adina L.|title=Mind Reading, Lie Detection, and Privacy|date=2015|url=https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4707-4_123|work=Handbook of Neuroethics|pages=679–695|editor-last=Clausen|editor-first=Jens|publisher=Springer Netherlands|doi=10.1007/978-94-007-4707-4_123|isbn=9789400747074|access-date=2019-08-15|editor2-last=Levy|editor2-first=Neil}}</ref>
 This element of cognitive liberty has been raised in relation to a number of state-sanctioned interventions in individual cognition, from the mandatory psychiatric 'treatment' of homosexuals in the US before the 1970s, to the non-consensual administration of psychoactive drugs to unwitting US citizens during [[CIA]] [[Project MKUltra]], to the forcible administration of mind-altering drugs on individuals to make them competent to stand trial.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Boire|first=Richard Glen|title=On Cognitive Liberty Part I|journal=Journal of Cognitive Liberties|date=1999|volume=1|issue=1|url=http://www.cognitiveliberty.org/curriculum/oncoglib_123.htm}}</ref><ref>Boire, Richard Glen, (2002). ''[http://www.cognitiveliberty.org/pdf/sell_ussc_merits.pdf Brief Amicus Curiae Of The Center For Cognitive Liberty & Ethics In Support Of The Petition]'', in the case of ''Sell v United States''</ref> Futurist and bioethicist George Dvorsky, Chair of the Board of the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies has identified this element of cognitive liberty as being of relevance to the debate around the curing of autism spectrum conditions.<ref>{{cite web|last=Dvorsky|first=George|title=Cognitive liberty and the right to one's mind|url=http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/more/dvorsky20091020|publisher=Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies|accessdate=3 May 2014}}</ref> Duke University School of Law Professor Nita A. Farahany has also proposed legislative protection of cognitive liberty as a way of safeguarding the protection from self-incrimination found in the Fifth Amendment to the US Constitution, in the light of the increasing ability to access human memory.<ref>{{cite journal|last=Farahany|first=Nita|title=Incriminating Thoughts|journal=Stanford Law Review|date=February 2012|volume=64|pages=405–406|url=http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5321&context=faculty_scholarship}}</ref>
@@ Line 48: / Line 52: @@
 ===In the United Kingdom===
-In the case of ''R v Hardison'', the defendant, charged with eight counts under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (MDA), including the production of [[DMT]] and [[LSD]], claimed that cognitive liberty was safeguarded by Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights.<ref>R v Hardison [2007] 1 Cr App R (S) 37</ref> Hardison argued that "individual sovereignty over one's interior environment constitutes the very core of what it means to be free", and that as psychotropic drugs are a potent method of altering an individual's mental process, prohibition of them under the MDA was in opposition to Article 9.<ref>Walsh, 433</ref> The court, however, disagreed, calling Hardison's arguments a "portmanteau defense" and relying upon the UN Drug Conventions and the earlier case of ''R v Taylor'' to deny Hardison's right to appeal to a superior court.<ref>Walsh, 437</ref> Hardison was convicted and given a 20-year prison sentence, though he was released on 29 May 2013 after nine years in prison.<ref>Walsh, 437</ref>
+In the case of ''R v Hardison'', the defendant, charged with eight counts under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (MDA), including the production of [[DMT]] and [[LSD]], claimed that cognitive liberty was safeguarded by Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights.<ref>R v Hardison [2007] 1 Cr App R (S) 37</ref> Hardison argued that "individual sovereignty over one's interior environment constitutes the very core of what it means to be free", and that as psychotropic drugs are a potent method of altering an individual's mental process, prohibition of them under the MDA was in opposition to Article 9.<ref>Walsh, 433</ref> The court, however, disagreed, calling Hardison's arguments a "portmanteau defense" and relying upon the UN Drug Conventions and the earlier case of ''R v Taylor'' to deny Hardison's right to appeal to a superior court.<ref>Walsh, 437</ref> Hardison was convicted and given a 20-year prison sentence, though he was released on 29 May 2013 after nine years in prison.<ref>Walsh, 437</ref> Casey Hardison's arrest marked the first detected case of LSD manufacture inside the UK since 1978's arrest of chemists Richard Kemp and Munro<ref>http://www.drugwise.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/Druglink-Jan-Feb-2011.pdf</ref>.
-==Criticism==
+Richard Kemp had originally written an 8,000 word defence statement for his arrest in the UK police investigation [[Operation Julie]] but was advised by his lawyers against using it. It was released at the time to a journalist at the Cambrian News who précised it under the headline ‘Microdoctrine – the tenets behind Kemp’s LSD’. The gist of Kemp’s defence was that LSD was a catalyst for social change, his motive behind the ring's leadership was the expectation that widespread use of LSD by Britain's youth would catalyse a leftist Revolution, leading to the overthrow of the aging and morally bankrupt. For the temerity of admitting this to post-arrest police, sentences totalled 120 years in prison.<ref>https://archive.org/stream/THELAND_201412/Acid%20Daze%20-%20Brotherhood%20of%20Eternal%20Love,%20History_djvu.txt</ref> The Kemp branch allegedly manufactured 50% of the world's LSD at the time, amounting to tens of millions of hits over a several year period.
+== Criticism ==
 While there has been little publicized criticism of the concept of cognitive liberty itself, drug policy reform and the concept of human enhancement, both closely linked to cognitive liberty, remain highly controversial issues. The recent development of neurosciences is increasing the possibility of controlling and influence specific mental functions.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Ferro|first=Fulvio|last2=Gerola|first2=Alessio|last3=Mazzocca|first3=Marco|last4=Sommaggio|first4=Paolo|date=2017-11-01|title=Cognitive liberty. A first step towards a human neuro-rights declaration|url=http://www.biodiritto.org/ojs/index.php?journal=biolaw&page=article&op=view&path%5B%5D=255|journal=BioLaw Journal - Rivista di BioDiritto|language=it|volume=0|issue=3|pages=27–45–45|issn=2284-4503}}</ref> The risks inherent in removing restrictions on controlled cognitive-enhancing drugs, including of widening the gap between those able to afford such treatments and those unable to do so, have caused many to remain skeptical about the wisdom of recognizing cognitive liberty as a right.<ref>Blitz, 1063</ref> political philosopher and Harvard University professor Michael J. Sandel, when examining the prospect of memory enhancement, wrote that "some who worry about the ethics of cognitive enhancement point to the danger of creating two classes of human beings – those with access to enhancement technologies, and those who must make do with an unaltered memory that fades with age."<ref>{{cite book|last=Sandel|first=Michael J.|title=The Case against Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic Engineering|date=2007|publisher=Harvard University Press|location=Cambridge, Massachusetts|isbn=9780674036383}}</ref> Cognitive liberty then faces opposition obliquely in these interrelated debates.